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In this article, we argue for the developmental primacy of social over visual
perspective-taking. In our terminology, social perspective-taking involves some
understanding of another person’s preferences, goals, intentions etc. which can be
discerned from temporally extended interactions, including dialog. As is evidenced by
their successful performance on various reference disambiguation tasks, infants in their
second year of life first begin to develop such skills. They can, for example, determine
which of two or more objects another is referring to based on previously expressed
preferences or the distinct quality with which these objects were jointly explored. The
pattern of findings from developmental research further indicates that this ability emerges
sooner than analogous forms of visual perspective-taking. Our explanatory account of
this developmental sequence highlights the primary importance of joint attention and the
formation of common ground with others. Before children can develop an awareness of
what exactly is seen or how an object appears from a particular viewpoint, they must
learn to share attention and build common “experiential” ground. Learning about others’
as well as one’s own “snapshot” perspectives in a literal, i.e., optical sense of the term,
is a secondary step that affords an abstraction from all (prior) pragmatic involvement with
objects.
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Visual perspective-taking tasks typically entail another agent who
embodies the spatial coordinates that the participant has to con-
sider. They are thus at least minimally social in the sense that
someone else is co-present and available for social interaction
(see Schütz, 1932). In line with this, children with autism, whose
difficulties are known to be first and foremost social in nature,
struggle to detemine how others see things from their viewpoint
(Reed, 2002; Hamilton et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2011; but see Hobson,
1984). At the same time, however, a “cold-cognitive” assessment
or computation of how objects relate to one another in space
is arguably less of a social affair than understanding another’s
affective, conceptual, or epistemic attitude toward a situation (see
Fishbein et al., 1972).
In this article, we adopt the opposition of visuo-spatial and
social perspective-taking employed by the editors. We will argue
from a developmental approach that social perspective-taking
is primary and precedes visual perspective-taking in human
ontogeny. Our claim is that children first learn to take perspectives
in situations that are not defined by differences in how self and
other perceive objects visually but by differences in their expe-
riential backgrounds, i.e., in what they did, witnessed, or heard.
It might seem more complex to keep track of another’s prior
encounters and engagement with things than to compute his
instantaneous visuo-spatial relation to an object in the room. Yet,
it will become clear that infants readily note and update “expe-
riential records” (Perner and Roessler, 2012, p. 522). Registering
and remembering what others did, witnessed, ormentioned is less
of a task demand for them than a helpful cue to others’ goals and
intentions. Per definition, no such cues from prior encounters are
available in visual perspective-taking tasks that revolve entirely
around momentary visuo-spatial relations.
First, we will review referential ambiguity tasks that are typi-
cally solved in the second year of life. It will become obvious that
infants readily rely on others’ previous expressions of attitude,
their prior attentional engagements with objects, and previous
discourse to solve the reference problem. These manifold abil-
ities of infants to establish reference against the background
of prior interactions are subsumed under “social perspective-
taking.”
An overview of studies on visual perspective-taking will show
that this ability has its onset noticably later. Again, it is gen-
erally taken for granted that perceptual perspective-taking pre-
cedes and serves as a foundation for the “deeper” forms of
social perspective-taking (Kessler and Thomson, 2010). The
same is suggested by accounts of mutual knowledge according
to which physical co-presence is the easiest and least error-
prone way to arrive at mutual knowledge (Clark and Marshall,
1981; Schiffer, 1972). These assumptions are seriously called
into question by the empirical fact that visual perspective-
taking does not precede but follows social perspective-taking
ontogenetically.
An excursion into the early development of graphic skills lends
further support to the idea that knowledge of visual perspec-
tives is a relatively late cognitive achievement that is derivative
of social perspective-taking. We will conclude with a program-
matic attempt to explain this developmental sequence with the
social and cooperative nature that sets humans apart from other
animals.
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THE ROLE OF THE EXPERIENTIAL BACKGROUND
PRIOR AFFECTIVE EXPRESSIONS
Affective displays are key indicators as to how people will behave
toward objects. In a seminal study, 14− and 18-month-old
infants were presented with two food items: crackers and broccoli
(Repacholi and Gopnik, 1997). The infants opted for the crack-
ers, whereas an adult displayed the opposite preference. When the
adult, without looking at either dish, later requested food from
the infants, the younger ones gave her what they themselves liked
(crackers), whereas the older ones selected the broccoli.
As was made clear by Perner et al. (2005), understanding
perspectives in sensu strictu, as evidenced by an explicit acknowl-
edgment of different takes on the self-same thing (“I cannot
stand broccoli, but she likes it!”) is not necessary for this test.
The infants just had to realize that the other and broccoli “go
together,” and so an understanding of objective “person-object
couplings” suffices to pass this test. Nonetheless, the older infants
were able to learn about the other’s taste preference from her prior
expressions. A study by Egyed et al. (2007) confirmed that, in the
absence of ostensive cues (which gear infants toward more object-
centered interpretations such as “Broccoli is good”; see Gergely
et al., 2007), 14-month-olds track specific persons’ affective dis-
plays toward objects and expect them to behave in accordance
with them later.
“Emotional eavesdropping” (Repacholi and Meltzoff, 2007)
provides further support that infants act differently vis-à-vis oth-
ers depending on their previously expressed affective attitudes.
When 18-month-olds witness an adult reprimand another for
performing a novel action, the infants later imitated the act less
when the adult was present as opposed to when he was absent.
Independently of their own desire or interest to perform an act,
infants thus alter their behavior as a function of others’ attitudes
toward objects and actions.
PRIOR ENGAGEMENT
Infants use various other cues to disambiguate reference. A pow-
erful one is the other’s familiarity with or ignorance of objects and
their locations (see O’Neill, 1996, for an influential study with 2−
and 2–5-year-olds). In their modification of a word learning study
(Akhtar et al., 1996), Tomasello and Haberl (2003) found that 1-
year-olds knew which of three objects an adult requested from
them based on her prior engagement with the objects. When the
adult excitedly asked infants for a toy, 12-month-olds chose the
one that was new for the adult because she failed to see it in
the past. Even though the infants themselves were equally famil-
iar with all toys, their responses showed that they knew what the
other had and had not witnessed a few moments prior.
MacPherson and Moore (2010) directly contrasted what an
adult knew with what the infant herself was familiar with. In their
study, two objects were mutually familiar for adult and infant,
a third object was new for the infant and a fourth was new for
the adult, but “old” for the infant. When the adult later excit-
edly requested a toy, 13-month-olds egocentrically chose what
was new for themselves, while 19-month-olds selected the toy that
was new for the adult and not for them.
Many studies have not just confirmed that infants readily track
others’ experiential backgrounds but have also yielded insights
into the scope and limits of this skill. Joint attention has been
shown to play an important role in interactive test situations.
Having observed as mere onlookers how an agent engages with
objects was insufficient for 14-month-olds to identify what the
agent requested from them based on his knowledge vs. igno-
rance of the different objects. When the infant and the agent
jointly engaged around the objects, infants successfully deter-
mined which things the other did and did not know (Moll and
Tomasello, 2007; Moll et al., 2007, 2008). In contrast to mere
onlooking, joint attention makes the co-attenders’ familiarity
with the object “mutually transparent” (Eilan, 2005)—it leaves no
room for doubt that the object has been registered. Furthermore,
it seems that unless the questioner clearly conveys that her excite-
ment is elicited by something that is new for her individually,
infants have a general bias to point out what is mutually famil-
iar and unifies self and other in prior bouts of shared experiences
(Saylor and Ganea, 2007; Liebal et al., 2009, 2011).
In a study that aimed to test false belief understanding,
infants saw an adult as striving for different goals depending
on what he witnessed earlier (Buttelmann et al., 2009). After
the adult had placed an object in a box, he either attentively
watched it being moved to a different container (true belief) or
failed to witness the transfer (false belief). When the adult later
approached the box from which the object had been removed,
18-month-olds helped him to get the box open (“He must want
something else from this box!”) in the true belief, but retrieved
the object from its new location in the false belief condition.
Again, this demonstrates that infants take what others have wit-
nessed into account when acting and responding toward them.
They revert to the background constituted by past experiences
and use it to inform them about an agent’s desires, goals, and
intentions.
Looking-time studies on false belief understanding further
support this idea (e.g., Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Surian et al.,
2007; Kovács et al., 2010). Even in their first year of life, infants
look longer when they see an agent acting in a way that disac-
cords with his prior perceptual experiences (he acts as if he knows
something he did not observe) than when they see him behave
in ways that are consistent with what he observed. Whether belief
understanding can be captured with this method remains the sub-
ject of an ongoing debate (Perner and Ruffman, 2005; Low and
Perner, 2012), but what this research unequivocally demonstrates
is that infants at a very young age are aware of what others have
and have not registered perceptually. The findings also relativize
the importance of joint attention suggested by interactive stud-
ies, because infants in looking-time tests usually do not jointly
attend with the other and, in some cases, have not even reached
the age at which they are able to do so. Joint attention might thus
only play a critical role when infants have to directly respond
to the agent in a communicative or cooperative act, which
might require a more explicit understanding of knowledge and
ignorance.
PRIOR DISCOURSE
To not talk past, but speak with each other, interlocutors must
know what they can and cannot presuppose as mutually given.
Part of what defines the mutually given is the shared prior
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discourse—what Clark and Marshall (1981) refer to as “linguis-
tic co-presence” in their model of mutual knowledge forma-
tion. Anecdotal evidence of “egocentric speech” (Piaget, 1929,
1955) alongside experimental data questioned children’s skills in
communicative perspective-taking. Young children tend to use
pronouns (e.g., O’Neill and Holmes, 2002) and definite articles
(Maratsos, 1976; Power and dal Martello, 1986) without hav-
ing provided the antecedent. Their descriptions are often not
specific enough to allow the listener to discern reference—even
after requests for clarification were made, thus challenging effort-
less communication (see Glucksberg and Krauss, 1967; Deutsch
and Pechmann, 1982; Sonnenschein and Whitehurst, 1984).
Generally, young children have a tendency to underestimate the
informativeness that is needed to communicate effectively (Olson
and Torrance, 1987).
At the same time, evidence accumulates that even infants
adjust their (speech) behavior according to what has been shared
linguistically. For example, 2-year-olds use more informative
naming constructions when a referent is new than when it is
given, in the sense that it was part of previous discourse.Matthews
et al. (2006) had 2-year-olds watch a video of a character perform-
ing an action (e.g., a clown jumping) together with an assistant.
The assistant mentioned the character to the child. Another adult,
who had either participated in the discourse or not then asked
children to narrate what happened. In their replies, the children
referred to the character more often with a pronoun (instead of
a full noun) when their interlocutor had participated in the prior
discourse than when he was not part of this discourse (see Nayer
and Graham, 2006, for similar results with 3-year-olds). In Clark
and Marshall’s (1981) terms, the children tailored their refer-
ences to the linguistic copresence they shared with their particular
interlocutor.
On the side of comprehension, even 1-year-olds are sensitive
to what is and is not linguistically co-present. Ganea and Saylor
(2007) found that 15- and 18-month-olds rely on a person’s prior
verbal reference to an absent object to determine what the same
person is speaking of a few moments later. After an adult made
clear that she was searching for a particular object (e.g., a puppy),
she exclaimed that she knew where “it” was and led the infant
to a cabinet. Two objects—the target (puppy) and a distractor—
were revealed, and the adult ambiguously asked “Can you get
it for me?” Infants at both ages selected the target object, thus
showing that they located the referent in the adult’s prior speech.
Echoing the findings on prior attentional engagement (e.g., Moll
et al., 2008; Liebal et al., 2009), the infants also knew with which
particular person they shared the linguistic background: When
a different adult than the one who had searched articulated the
request, the infants grasped objects randomly.
A further indication that infants keep track of and update
records of linguistic co-presence is their appropriate use of ellip-
tical constructions in discourse. In a study by Salomo et al.
(2010), 2-year-olds were asked, “What’s the agent doing now?”
after watching and hearing verbal descriptions of videos show-
ing either the same action performed on different patients (e.g., a
frog feeding a duck vs. a ladybug) or different actions performed
on the same patient (e.g., a frog feeding vs. washing a duck). In
their answers, the children omitted reference to the patient when
it remained the same and was thus given in the prior discourse.
When the patient changed and was thus new, the same children
made reference to it with a lexical noun. The children thus knew
when null-references were and were not warranted given the dis-
course background. Additional evidence that 2-year-olds know
which information is obligatory vs. optional in speech stems from
observations of children who acquire “null-argument” languages;
i.e., languages that allow the omission of subjects and objects
given the appropriate discourse context (Serratrice, 2005).
Taken together, these findings clearly demonstrate that infants
produce and understand gestures and speech acts against the
background of their prior interactions with other persons (see
Wittgenstein, 2001; Tomasello, 2008). What infuses the ges-
tures and speech acts with meaning is the intersubjectively
shared background of prior experiences. Through joint atten-
tion, infants construct a common ground (Clark, 1996) with
specific other persons, and they discriminate between the dyad-
specific common grounds, keeping track of what they have
and have not shared with whom. In their attempts to secure
reference, they naturally revert to these backgrounds, which
becomes particularly obvious under conditions of potential
ambiguity.
VISUAL PERSPECTIVE-TAKING: NO HELP FROM THE
BACKGROUND
None of the above is available in visual perspective-taking. All that
is relevant here are instantaneous viewing angles and momentary
spatial relations. The experiential background offers no help to
solve referential ambiguity in these tests. In fact, a prerequisite
that has to be met to guarantee the validity of these tests is that
the candidate objects be “experientially neutral,” i.e., that target
and distractor cannot be distinguished by any distinct roles they
played in prior interactions. The correct response has to depend
entirely on the objects’ visibility (level 1) or mode of presentation
(level 2 perspective-taking, see e.g., Flavell, 1992, for the distinc-
tion of level 1 vs. level 2) from a particular viewpoint. We will
limit our analysis to level 1 visual perspective-taking, i.e., the abil-
ity to determine what another can and cannot see. This level of
perspective-taking emerges a couple of years prior to level 2, and
is structurally similar to the tasks above, which dealt with chil-
dren’s understanding of what others desired, witnessed, or spoke
about. Level 2 is a more effortful, qualitatively distinct (Kessler
and Rutherford, 2010), phylogenetically recent (human-specific)
skill, that requires an explicit understanding of perspectival dif-
ferences and, in the absence of autism (see Hamilton et al., 2009),
emerges between 4 and 5 years.
Children first exhibit an understanding of what others can and
cannot see at around 2 years of age and older. For example, when
24-month-olds witness an adult searching for something, they
preferably hand her an object that is blocked from the adult’s view
instead of a mutually visible one (Moll and Tomasello, 2006). In a
similar task by Nurmsoo and Bloom (2008), 31-month-olds also
mostly selected an object that was hidden from an adult’s view
when he pretended to be searching for something. (One should
note that there was a confound with gaze direction in this study:
The adult looked straight at the visible distractor object when ask-
ing “where” the referent was, allowing children to act on a simple
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heuristic that people do not search for things at which they are
currently looking.)
In one of several tasks administered by Masangkay et al.
(1974), children between 2 and 3 correctly judged that an adult
sitting across from them could not see an apple depicted on the
front of a card held between them. Hughes and Donaldson (1979)
found that 3-year-olds knew where to place a doll in a house
so that none of several policemen at various positions could see
her. In another study, 2.5−, but not 2-year-olds, granted an adult
visual access to an object he desired to see by either revealing
the object from behind an occluder or moving away the occluder
(Lempers et al., 1977). In an “analogy task” developed by Yaniv
and Shatz (1990) 3.5-year-olds were able to place a duck so that a
doll perceiver saw the same part or side (e.g., its back) of the duck
as another doll that looked at an identical duck.
In sum, we find that level 1 perspective-taking as demonstrated
by tests using interactive methods emerges between the second
and third birthday. This ability comprises percept production
(enabling another to see something), percept diagnosis (judging
what another sees), and percept deprivation (hiding objects from
another). In Clark andMarshall’s (1981) terms, it is now that chil-
dren have come to understand when mutual knowledge is and is
not supported by immediate physical co-presence.
However, children at this age are far from being proficient at
visual perspective-taking. On the contrary, striking limitations
have been identified. Under the age of 3, children are unable to
hide an object from an adult by placing a barrier between her
and the object (Flavell et al., 1978; McGuigan and Doherty, 2002).
Two-year-olds also struggle to select appropriate referring expres-
sions depending on what their interlocutor can see. While the
children in Matthews et al.’s (2006) above-mentioned study suc-
cessfully tailored their expressions to the prior discourse, they did
not adjust their speech accordingly when the adult’s visual access
to the video was manipulated. More concretely, they did not pro-
duce more full nouns (instead of the less informative pronouns)
when the adult failed to see the video compared to when he saw
it. In Yaniv and Shatz’s (1990) study, 3-year-olds preferably posi-
tioned the duck facing the doll, even when asked to place it so
that the doll would see its back. They thus exerted a bias to gen-
erate the canonical or good—in this case the frontal—view of the
object, irrespective of the instruction (see Light and Nix, 1983;
more on a similar phenomenon in children’s drawings below).
A DEVELOPMENTAL LAG
Taken together, these studies point at a developmental lag between
social and visual perspective-taking. Infants rely on prior joint
perceptual experiences including previously shared discourse at
least 1 year before they take into account others’ visuo-spatial
relations to the things around them when they discern or estab-
lish reference. This is a significant décalage given the young age
of these children. Contra Clark and Marshall (1981) and con-
tra intuition, immediate physical co-presence does not necessarily
facilitate the delineation of common ground. While it is true that
physical co-presence often rightly signals that a given object fig-
ures in the common ground, the same co-presence can hampen
children’s ability to identify what is mutually given fromwhat they
have privileged access to as individuals. It can trick them into
falsely assuming that an object they see is perceptually available
to the other as well. The strong priority that is ascribed to an
ad-hoc formation of mutual knowledge based on immediate or
potential physical co-presence is thus called into question by this
developmental sequence.
That the lag is real and robust becomes particularly obvious
in studies in which an understanding of knowledge and igno-
rance is directly contrasted with visual perspective-taking. Moll
et al. (2010) compared 2-year-olds’ ability to detect an adult’s
ignorance due to absence vs. impeded vision. When the adult dis-
engaged entirely from her interaction with the child by leaving
after having shared two toys with her, the children later knew that
the adult was unfamiliar with a third object that they were pre-
sented with. But when the adult remained co-present with her
visual access to the third object blocked by a barrier as the child
explored it, the children later acted as if the adult was familiar
with this object. They failed to recognize the barrier’s effect.
A very similar pattern emerged in Nurmsoo and Bloom’s
(2008) study. In their second experiment, 31-month-olds had no
problem identifying what an adult was looking for when she had
hidden one object but was absent when the other was hidden—
thus making her ignorant of the second object’s location. By
contrast, children this age found it relatively difficult to determine
what the adult searched for when he had seen neither placement
but was spatially positioned so that he could not see one of the
objects (Experiment 1). Similarly, and as mentioned above, while
2-year-olds in Matthews et al.’s (2006) study readily switched to
more informative references when an object was not shared in
prior discourse with an adult, they failed to adjust the informa-
tiveness of their speech accordingly when the referent was blocked
from the adult’s sight. Taken as a whole, these studies clearly show
that young children can draw the knowledge-ignorance distinc-
tion before they solve otherwise identical tests that tap visual
perspective-taking.
The same gap has been identified with looking-time measures
as well. Again, when this method is applied, infants as young
as 7 months show a sensitivity to the manipulation of percep-
tually induced beliefs (Kovács et al., 2010). They look longer
when an agent behaves in a way that is inconsistent with what
she witnessed earlier than when her behavior matches her prior
observations (someone looks for something where she last saw it).
In contrast, the youngest age for which level 1 visual perspective-
taking has been documented with the looking-time technique is
13–16 months (Luo and Baillargeon, 2007; Sodian et al., 2007;
Luo and Beck, 2010). For example, when 13-month-olds repeat-
edly see an adult reaching for one of two toys, they form an
expectation that he will keep doing so—as evidenced by longer
looks when he suddenly reaches for the previously ignored toy.
But they only form this expectation when the agent is able to
see the alternative object, and thus disprefers it. No extended
looks were shown when the non-chosen toy was blocked from the
agent’s view, and so simply unseen.
Further indication that 13-month-olds have rudimentary skills
in visual perspective-taking stems from a study that is purported
to test false belief comprehension (Surian et al., 2007). In this
looking-time experiment, a caterpillar’s knowledge of his pre-
ferred object’s location was manipulated by the presence/absence
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of a barrier impeding the caterpillar’s, but not the child’s, vision of
the object. The authors do not interpret their results in terms of
visual perspective-taking. But partly because looking-time mea-
sures involve no “task” (the child is not asked or prompted to
respond to anything in particular), it remains open which aspect
infants mainly reacted to or found harder to process: realizing the
barrier’s defeating effect on the agent’s vision, or keeping track of
what he did and did not witness.
In either case, the same developmental lag that is found with
interactive response methods becomes manifest when looking
times are applied, albeit at a younger age—reflecting the reduced
task affordances of this method. The fact that the developmental
order pervades different research methods shows its robustness.
But it has to be emphasized that the lag is limited to level 1 visual
perspective-taking and its corresponding counterparts in social
perspective-taking. A more synchronous pattern is found at level
2, which affords an explicit knowledge of the possibility of alter-
native, and potentially false, views. This knowledge, which spans
across visual and social perspectives alike, is formed between 4
and 5 years—supporting the idea of a common cognitive thread
that runs through various perspective problems (see Perner et al.,
2003; Moll and Meltzoff, 2012). The gap that calls for an explana-
tion thus only exists in the early beginnings of perspective-taking,
before a more abstract and uniform understanding of perspec-
tives develops in late preschool.
The pressing question then is how the counterintu-
itive sequence of visual perspective-taking preceding social
perspective-taking observed in the early years can be explained.
We will make a first explanatory attempt by addressing the more
specific question of why visual perspective-taking might pose a
particular challenge (see Moll and Meltzoff, 2012).
SHARED PERCEPTUAL SPACES
We argue that young children have a proclivity to treat social
interaction as a sufficient condition for shared perceptual avail-
ability: “When you and I are co-present and engaged, you should
be able to perceive what I perceive.” An impression of a shared
perceptual space is induced, and only later overcome once chil-
dren learn more about and attend more to the specific defeating
conditions of perception, such as a blocked line of sight.
Support for the idea that co-presence and social engagement
create an illusion of shared perception comes from experimen-
tal data with both children and adults. Glucksberg and Krauss
(1967) report that preschoolers produced iconic gestures and
used demonstratives (“It goes like this!”) to describe objects to
their conversational partner who sat across from an occluder.
The work of Keysar and colleagues shows that even adults have
a prepotent tendency to assume that others around them share
their perceptual access to objects, even when this is not true (e.g.,
Keysar et al., 2003; Epley et al., 2004; Keysar, 2007). Consistent
with what we know about children, adults are biased to over-
rather than underestimate what the other sees or knows (Keysar
and Henly, 2002; see also Bernstein et al., 2007). Interestingly,
the thicker or richer the common ground shared by two people,
the more likely they are to overrate the success of their com-
municative attempts (Wu and Keysar, 2007). The more that is
shared, the less prepared one is to identify when something is not
shared. A vast overlap in what is perceptually accessible weakens
the alertness to check if a particular object is mutually given or
not. In support of this, it was found that people communicate less
informatively to a concrete other person who “co-inhabits” their
perceptual space than to amerely imagined interlocutor (Schober,
1993). This is much in line with our developmental finding that
corporeal co-presence, and thus a high overlap in what can poten-
tially be turned into an object of shared attention, hampens young
children’s ability to detect others’ ignorance (Moll et al., 2010).
This overestimation effect also helps to explain young chil-
dren’s notoriously poor perspective-taking skills when speaking
on the phone. It has long been known that children use man-
ual gestures, demonstratives, and non-specific references during
phone conversations (Bordeaux andWillbrand, 1987;Warren and
Tate, 1992)—indicating that they are unaware of the fact that they
and the things around them cannot be seen. In our interpreta-
tion, the shared discourse elicits the false impression of a generally
shared perceptual space that spans across different sense modal-
ities, including vision. That is, verbally established co-presence
leads to the illusory impression of shared visual perception.
This idea, however, is called into question by experiments
suggesting that others’ viewpoints make their way into our con-
siderations effortlessly and automatically (Qureshi et al., 2010).
When asked how many items they see in a visual array, adults
and school-age children are slower and less accurate in their judg-
ments if their visual input mismatches that of another agent who
is part of the scene they watch (Samson et al., 2010; Surtees
and Apperly, 2012; see also Surtees et al., 2012). Two things
can be said to reconcile these findings with our overestimation
thesis. Firstly, it is conceivable that once level 1 visual perspective-
taking has been practiced for years, it becomes “second nature” or
automated. Secondly, the participants’ situation differs drastically
between the studies. In those studies supporting the overestima-
tion thesis, the child interacts with the other directly, which might
let the perspectival differences between them dissolve “in the heat
of the moment.” In the tasks suggesting automatic perspective-
taking, participants have a contemplative, theoretical distance to
the other, who figures in the array like an object. This theoreti-
cal distance could highlight the other’s position in relation to the
remaining items in the scene. The two sets of findings thus do not
necessarily contradict each other.
A GLANCE AT EARLY PICTURE-MAKING
It was speculated that before children’s perception is corrupted
by language and thought, they ought to see the world with inno-
cent, i.e., objective eyes (see Matisse, 1953) and even master
perfectly the art of drawing in linear perspective (Bühler, 1930;
Sully, 1895). But of course, by the time children have the motor
skills and motivation to depict objects and events, they have long
been language- and concept-using beings who have passed any
hypothetical phase of innocent vision (see Costall, 1997, 2001).
When children begin to draw figuratively, they do not faith-
fully translate three-dimensional objects onto two-dimensional
picture planes. They show no intention to depict things exactly
the way they appear to them from one fixed point of observation.
Drawing does not serve the goal of imitating visual experiences.
As a famous dictum says, children “draw what they know, not
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what they see” (but see Arnheim, 1974, p. 164, for rightly criticiz-
ing the false opposition of seeing and knowing that is employed
here)—exhibiting a style dubbed “intellectual realism” (Luquet,
1927). They include aspects and elements in their pictures that
cannot be seen from their present perspective and may not be vis-
ible from any particular, single viewpoint. They create a “good”
or ideal view of objects by depicting features they consider rel-
evant or important and omitting what is irrelevant. The goal is
not to produce a correct perspectival reconstruction but to show
objects in their typical form and thus to capture their constitu-
tive or essential features. For example, a cup will be depicted in
canonical fashion with a handle on its side (ideal for grasping, see
Cox, 1991). Likewise, humans are shown in their canonical frontal
view with a face including two eyes (ideal for social interaction),
whereas trunk, nose and other parts might be left out (Cox, 1997).
Also, young children mostly produce images spontaneously
frommemory and imagination (Golomb, 2004). When presented
with a model to guide their drawing activity, they rarely look up
to see what the object exactly looks like. The model serves as a
source of inspiration—it provides a theme or motif and is rele-
vant insofar it exemplifies a generic object (Luquet, 1927), but it
is not adhered to as an original that ought to be replicated. Again,
what this indicates is that children do not intend but fail to draw
from a fixed perspective.
In his essay “Perspective as symbolic form,” Panofsky (1927)
pointed out that a faithful reconstruction of what is seen from a
particular viewpoint affords a severe abstraction from the con-
tent of experience. In his own words, it is a modern technique
that rests on a motivation to strip away the experiential or “given”
space and substitute it with a systematic, purely visual space. An
individualistic and somewhat arbitrary factor thereby gets intro-
duced, because one commits to showing the scene from a single,
static point of observation. Any ordering according to what is
regarded important or relevant has to make way for a strictly
geometric ordering.
With this held in mind, it becomes much less puzzling why
an awareness of visual perspectives emerges rather late—not just
in history, but in ontogeny as well (see Gablik, 1977, for paral-
lels between the history and genetic development of visual art).
Though children at age 5 and older can be induced to draw what
they see, it is not before 7 or 8 years that they spontaneously create
view-dependent images (Davis, 1983; Cox, 1991). Even at this age,
their advances are such that they acknowledge partial occlusion
and draw only what is visible (e.g., the correct number of faces
of a cube), but they still do not depict the visible parts precisely
in the way they appear (e.g., with lines converging in a vanishing
point; Bremner and Batten, 1991; Cox, 1991).
What is of primary importance to children is to share the world
of those around them. Precisely how this shared world presents
itself from one specific vantage point is secondary and does not
become thematic in the very early stages. First and foremost,
drawing serves to “make sense of the world” (Arnheim, 1969,
p. 257)—and this is true ontogenetically as well. Young children
draw to narrate events and give “shape and order” (Cox, 2005) to
their experiences. We want to go further and argue that picture-
making primarily serves to make sense of the social world, as
one of the first and most frequent motifs is the human figure
(Maitland, 1895; Lark-Horovitz et al., 1939; see Cox, 1993, for an
overview). But not just the themes or motifs are social; so is the
process of drawing. It is an activity that is typically shown in the
presence of another to whom the child narrates as she draws, and
for whom she might create the picture as a gift. The graphic prod-
uct in itself can hardly be interpreted without the accompanying
speech in which children reconstruct their experiences and reveal
what they intend to draw (Cox, 2005).
In either case, we find that the relatively late onset of tak-
ing others’ visual perspectives is paralleled by a late emergence
of the use of perspective in drawings. Young children’s pictures
document their inattention to specific visual perspectives. Just
like there was no motivation to graphically capture objects from
specific, transient viewpoints in the early history of visual art
(Panofsky, 1927), so do children show no interest in representing
things precisely the way they happen to see them. They ignore the
contingent ways in which things appear momentarily for the sake
of capturing what belongs to an object more generally. This also
becomes manifest in perceptual self-reports. When preschoolers
are asked to indicate how they perceive a visual array by choosing
from among a set of different pictures, they often judge incor-
rectly and select a picture showing the ideal rather than their own
view (Liben and Belknap, 1981; Light and Nix, 1983). The upshot
is that children’s drawings are one of several pieces of converging
evidence that young children pay little attention to differences in
visual perspective. Others are their faulty perceptual reports, their
behavior during phone conversations, and, as we have seen, pro-
found struggles with visual perspective-taking—neither of which
require graphic skills.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Humans are extraordinarily relational and interdependent beings
(MacMurray, 1961). They are adapted to rely on and cooperate
with others in a way that is unparalleled in the animal kingdom
(Gintis et al., 2003). Especially in the early beginnings, a human
individual is entirely dependent on others’ care, attention, and
sharing of knowledge (Csibra and Gergely, 2011). What is cru-
cial at this early stage is that the child comes to share the world
of those around her. She accomplishes this by jointly attending
to things with others. It is in these bouts of joint attention that
the child learns about objects: their gestalts, functions, and labels
etc. Importantly, these are perspective-invariant properties. The
focus lies on the object and its qualities, not on the different
perspectives from which each co-attender perceives it (Campbell,
2012; Moll and Meltzoff, 2012; Seemann, 2012). Only once it can
be taken for granted that we attend to the same thing, is there
room, in a second step, to “objectify” the different viewpoints
from which each of us perceives the object. As Campbell (2012, p.
428) puts it, “The point is that a grasp of the different perspectives
from which a thing may be experienced should not be allowed to
take on a life of its own; this grasp of the different perspectives
from which a thing may be experienced is always grounded in a
prior knowledge of which thing is in question.”
But this merely seems to explain why joint attention precedes
knowledge of perspectives, not why children engage in social
perspective-taking before visual perspective-taking. However, we
think that these two things are related. In joint attention, one’s
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knowledge of the object becomes mutually transparent and so
does the expression of one’s attitude toward it. While the focus
of joint attention is the object itself, it simultaneously informs
us of the other’s knowledge of it as well as her take on it. Joint
attention thus directly supports the forms of social perspective-
taking discussed in this article, which are critical for cooperative
communication and other forms of collaborative activities.
The visuo-spatial positions of the co-attenders, in contrast,
remain entirely in the background. Firstly, the viewing angles
involved usually bear no significance with regard to the object,
its qualities, or the other’s attitude toward it. Secondly, given the
dynamic character of joint attention, these perspectives rarely
remain constant but tend to fluctuate over the course of explo-
ration, as the object gets manipulated and/or the spatial positions
changed. Joint attention thus directly paves the way to early forms
of social, but not visual perspective-taking.
The picture looks very different for non-human primates that
possess simple forms of visual perspective-taking. Chimpanzees
have been shown to preferably approach food that is blocked from
a dominant individual’s sight (Hare et al., 2000), and to seek out
locations and motion paths that hide their bodies from competi-
tors (Whiten and Byrne, 1988; Hare et al., 2006). These behaviors
are advantageous in potentially antagonistic and risky encoun-
ters with conspecifics or predators (Hare and Tomasello, 2004).
They are evolutionarily adaptive for animals that are yoked much
tighter into the here and now than humans and do not engage in
shared intentionality and cooperation. We think that joint atten-
tion and cooperation bridge spatial distances between self and
other and thus privilege social over visual perspective-taking. The
competitive and individualistic mode of operating found in non-
human primates, in contrast, makes an awareness of the visibility
of resources and one’s own body to others critical for survival.
Generally, visuo-spatial perspective-taking is seen as the most
basic and embodied form of perspective-taking, that is expected
to subserve and function as a model for more mental or higher-
cognitive forms, such as imagining how others feel or think about
a certain situation (as is also suggested by spatial metaphors
such as “putting oneself in another’s position/shoes,” see Kessler
and Thomson, 2010). The genetic primacy of social over visual
perspective-taking that we argued and provided empirical sup-
port for is at odds with this idea of visual perspective-taking
as the cradle for other kinds of perspective-taking. Being aware
of and responsive to others’ literal viewpoints can certainly be
key in social interaction. To communicate effectively we often
have to adjust our speech and non-verbal behavior according
to what the other sees or how he sees things—e.g., when we
direct him to an object outside of his visual field or ask him
to move his left shoulder that is on our right as we stand fac-
ing him. But getting a grip on others’ visual perspectives takes
time ontogenetically, and is not the first skill of its type to
emerge.
We tried to show in this article that before children come to
know what is seen from which particular viewpoint, they not only
bridge perspectival differences in acts of joint attention and deic-
tic reference by the age of 9–12 months, allowing them to create
a common ground of shared experience with others. They also
readily track and update what others have witnessed, done, and
said. This knowledge is foundational for effective communica-
tion and other forms of cooperation, as it constitutes the back-
ground against which gestures and speech acts are understood
and produced. We cited empirical evidence that children develop
an awareness of visual perspectives somewhat later. This is not
only suggested by the relatively late onset of visual perspective-
taking, but is also reflected in children’s aperspectival drawings
and false perceptual judgments. In our attempt to explain the
counterintuitive sequence from social to visual perspective-taking
we highlighted the primary importance of forming experiential
backgrounds with others for the sake of communication and
cooperation. If the developmental trajectory that we traced is
informative with regard to the relation between visual and social
perspective-taking in cognitively mature human beings remains
an open question.
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